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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. ~ a t u r t ?  of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's order summarily dismissing in part Joseph 
Baxter's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing and denying the 
remainder of Mr. Baxter's petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
On August 3 I., 2005, while serving time in the Twin Falls Criminal Justice Facility, Mr. 
Baxter was charged by Complaint with injuring jails in violation of Idaho Code 3 18-7018 and a 
persistent violator enhancement pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2514. Case No. 32668, R. 7-8.' 
These charges arose following an incident in which Mr. Baxter removed a telephone from the 
wall in his ja~l  cell Subsequenily, on December 6,2005, a one day jury tr~al  was held and Mr 
Baxter was found guilty of both injuring jails and the persistent violator enhancement. Case No 
32668, R. 40-41. On December 15, 2005, the district court sentenced Mr. Baxter to a unified 
term of six years, with one year determinate, to be served consecutively to the sentence Ivlr 
Baxter was serving at the time these charges arose. Case No. 32668, R. 43-48. Mr. Baxter 
appealed his sentence but the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence 
in an unpublished opinion. State v. Joseph Jackson Baxter, Docket No. 32668 (filed January 3, 
2007) (unpublished opinion). 
' Mr. Baxter has filed a Motion for Judicial Notice contemporaneously herewith aslung 
this Court to take judicial notice of the files, records, and transcripts in State v. Joseph Jackson 
Baxter, Docket No. 32668. 
1 
2. Post-Conviction Proceedings 
On March 11, 2008, Mr. Baxter filed a petition and affidavit for post-convict~on rel~ef 
alleging, ainong other things; that Idaho Code 5 18-7018 is unconstitutional, that his trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to argue that he did not injure the jail, and that appellate counsel was 
ineffective in failing to raise any issue other than imposition of ail excessive sentence. R. 9-59. 
Upoil request, Mr. Baxter was then appointed post-conviction counsel. R. 64. The State filed an 
answer to Mr. Baxter's petition for post-conviction relief and a motion for summary dismissal 
responding to most of Mr. Baxter's claims for relief. R. 65-87. The following day the district 
court filed a notice of intent to dismiss within twenty days. R. 88-92. The notice specifically 
stated that "[tlhis Court adopts the State's briefing as its Findings and Conclusions in this case" 
and advised Mr. Baxter that "the Petition for Post Conviction l iel id shall be dismissed with 
prejudicefor the veusons set forth in the State's brief' unless Mr. Baxter responds accordingly. 
(Emphasis in original.) R. 90. 
With the assistance of appointed counsel, Mr. Baxter submitted a response brief and 
supporting affidavit arguing, intev alia, that Mr. Baxter received inerfective assistance or trial 
and appellate couilsel because the injured telephone was not owned by the jail. R. 93-100. The 
district court then issued an order summarily dismissing the majority of Mr. Baxter's claims for 
relief and granting an evidentiary hearing upon the issues of whether the jail owned the phone 
and whether trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to argue that Mr. Baxter's 
actions did not fall within the injuring jails statute. R. 101-03. In its order summarily dismissing 
most of Mr. Baxter's claims, the district court articulated specific reasons some claims for relief 
were dismissed and then stated "[tlhe balance of Plaintiff's claims for relief, except [those to be 
addressed at the evidentiary hearing] are dismissed with prejudice for 'the reason that they are 
either duplicative of other issues in this case, are not supported by assertions of admissible 
evidence, are procedurally defaulted because not raised on direct appeal, or because they 
represent mere conclusory assertions not supported by the record or other evidence." R. 102. 
An evidentiary hearing was then held on February 3, 2009. Evidentiary Hearing 
~ianscript ("EI-I Tr.") p.4. The only two witnesses called at the evidentiary hearing were those 
called by the Petitioner; Mr. Ken Jackman, Operations Director for FSH Communications, LLC, 
and Mr. Baxter himself. See gelzerally, EH TR. Mr. Jaclunan, who did not testify at Mr. 
Baxter's trial, testified that the phone at issue was owned by FSH Communications but that the 
Twin Falls County Jail was billed $325.67 for the cost of replacing the damaged phone. EHTr. 
p.7, Ins. 14-15 & Petitioner's Ex. I. Mr. Baxter then testified that he did damage the phone but 
did not injure the wall of his jail cell. EH Tr. p.13, Ins. 19-24. 
The district court subsequently denied Mr. Baxter's remaining claims for relief in a 
written order. R. 105-13. Mr. Baxter then filed a motion for reconsideration along with a 
supporting affidavit, arguing that the Twin Falls County Jail still had not paid FSH 
Communications for the repairs for the phone and therefore the district court's findings were in  
error and should be vacated. R. 114-20. The district court amended its prior factual findings but 
ultimately denied Mr. Baxter's motion for reconsideration. R. 135-37. Mr. Boylan timely 
appealed. R. 121-124. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Baxter's claim that Idaho 
Code $ 18-7018 is unconstitutional because it did so on grounds different from those previously 
asserted by the district court and the State? 
B. Did the district court e n  when it concluded Mr. Baxter received effective assistance of 
trial counsel even though it was objectively unreasonable that trial counsel failed to argue the jail 
had not been injured? 
C. Did the district court err when it concluded Mr. Baxter received effective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal even though it was objectively unreasonable that appellate counsel 
failed to not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Baxter's Claim Alleging that 
Idaho Code S; 18-7018 was Unconstitutional on Grounds Dqferent from Those 
Previously Asserted by the State or Adopted by the District Court. 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding in which the petitioner is 
required to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. McKeetlz v. State, 140 
Idaho 847, 849, 103 P.3d 460,462 (2004); Lovelnizd v. State, 141 Idaho 933,935, 120 P.3d 751, 
753 (Ct. App. 2005). Once filed, either palty or even the court sua sporzte is permitted to seek 
summary disposition of the petition. Summary dismissal is authorized under Idaho Code $ 19- 
4906 and is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Specifically. 
sections (b) and (c) of Idaho Code 3 19-4906 provide in pertinent part: 
(b) When a couit is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, 
and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no 
purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties 
its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant 
shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. . . 
(c) The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the 
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
intei~ogatoiies, and admibsions and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The reason for the 20 day notice requirement in subsection (b) is so that the petitioner 
will have an opportunity to respond to the court's concerns. Sua .sponte dismissals without the 
20 day notice are not allowed. Saykhanzchone v. Stale, 127 Idaho 319,900 P.2d 795 (1995). 
Further, when summary dismissal is sought by the state, the state is required to provide notice in 
its motion of the specific grounds therefore. Id. 
In Suykhainchoize, the state filed an answer to a petition for post-conviction relief and in 
the answer's prayer for relief asked the court to dismiss without further hearings. The Supreme 
Court held this document was not sufficient to give Saykhamchone notice of the grounds upon 
which dismissal was being sought. The Supreme Court stated that "at a minimum the state's 
prayer for relief in the Answer was deficient for not stating its grounds witlzparticularity, and for 
not stating that i t  was the state's inotio~z for summary disposition under1.C. 3 19-4906(c)." 
Saykhanzchoize, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798 (emphasis in original). Therefore, summary 
dismissal without 20 days notice from the district court as to the reasons for dismissal was error. 
Similarly, "if the State moves to dismiss a petition under Idaho Code 3 19-4906(c), the 
court cannot dismiss a claim on a ground not asserted by the State in its motion unless the court 
gives the twenty-day notice required by Section 19-4906(b)." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 
602,200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009) (citing Saykharnchone, 127 Idaho at 322,900 P.2d at 798). 
However if a "district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction application relying in part on 
the same grounds presented by the state in its motion for summary dismissal, the notice 
requirement has been met." Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517,211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 
2009) (clting Worknzan v. State, 144 Idaho 518,524, 164 P.3d 798,804 (2007)). In order for the ' 
state's motion for summary dismissal to sufficiently satisfy the notice requirement under these 
circumstances the "overlap between the reasoning in the district court's decision and the state's 
motion to dismiss must be substantial." Id. 
In this case, the State moved for summary disposition. R. 70-87. The district court then 
adopted the State's briefing as its findings and conclusions, thereby giving Mr. Baxter twenty 
days notice based upon the reasons set forth by the State. However, the district court then 
summarily dismissed Mr. Baxter's claim that Idaho Code $ 18-7018 is unconstitutional on 
grounds that were not raised by the State. As a result, the state's motion and the district court's 
notice o f  intent to dismiss did not meet the requirements prescribed in Saykhamchoize, DeRushe, 
and Buss. 
In his pro se brief Mr. Baxter uiiequivocaily stated that "ISSUE TWO" included whether 
"the statute the petitioner convicted [sic] under Unconstitutional?" Brief in Support, p.4. K. 18. 
Though not grammatically perlect, Mr. Baxter nevertheless set forth a claim for relief premised 
upon the unconstituLionality o f  the statute for which he was found guilty. Mr. Baxter then set 
foith his reasoning in support o f  this claim. Brief in Support, p. 11. R. 25 
In response to Mr. Baxter's argument, the State combined Mr. Baxter's constitutional 
argument with another claim for relief and asserted: 
In allegations four and five, the defendant asserts I.C. $ 18-7018 is 
unconstitutionally "broad;" and therefore, "the District Court lacked jurisdiction 
to put the petitioner on trial, and sentence him, and charge him with a felony 
[because the case should] have been tried as a misdemeanor." The defendant 
merely asserts his allegations in a conclusory fashion. The defendant has failed to 
sustain his burden o f  providing affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting 
these allegations. Therefore, the defendant's allegations in number four and five 
must be summarily dismissed. 
Motion for Summary Disposition, p.8. (Internal citations omitted.) R. 77. Then, as noted above, 
the district court issued its notice of intent to dismiss, stating "[tlhis Court adopts the State's 
briefing as its Findings and Conclusions in this case" and therefore "the Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief shall be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth iiz the State's brief . 
. ." Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post Coiiviction Petition, p.3. R. 90. 
In response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, Mr. Baxter filed a Response 
Brief Mu Baxter d ~ d  not specif~cally respond to the State's argument that h ~ s  constttut~onal 
challenge to the statute at issue was conclusory. Nevertheless, the district coua summarily 
dismissed Mr. Baxter's constitutional argument on grounds not previously asserted by the State 
or adopted by the district court. Instead the district court reasoned, "Plaintiff's claims for relief 
relating to the u~iconstitutionalit~of the statute are dismissed with prejudice for the reason that 
this issue should have been raised on direct appeal." Order Dismissing Portion of Petition and 
Directing Hearing, p.2. R. 102. This sua sponte dismissal withotit prior notice was in error. 
Because proper notice was not given, the order summarily dismissing Mr. Baxter's claim 
that Idaho Code 5 18-7018 is unconstitutional should be revel-sed and the matter remanded f o ~  
further proceedings on those issues. 
B. The District Court Erred in Finding that Trial Counsel Did not Provide Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel by Failing to Argue that Mr. Baxter Did Not Injure the Jail. 
In his pro se petition for post-conviction relief Mr. Baxter alleged that his trial counsel 
was ineffective in multiple respects. One of those allegations, which was clarified in his 
response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, was that trial counsel failed to 
investigate and argue that the phone admittedly damaged by Mr. Baxter was not owned by the 
Twln Falls County Jail. Presumably based upon Mr. Baxter's response bilef and supporting 
affidavit, the district court granted an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Baxter "received 
ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel relating to his assertions that the 
damaged telephone is not owned by the jail, and hence not within the proscription of the statute 
under which he was convicted." Order Dismissing Portion of petition and Directing Hearing, 
p.2. R. 102. The district court continued, stating it was "limiting the evidentiary hearing to 
issues involving ownership of the phone and whether or not counsel properly argued that the 
conduct of Mr. Baxter fell within the Statute under which he was convicted." Order Dismissing 
Portion of Petition and Directing Hearing, p.3. R. 103. As noted above, an evidentiary hearing 
was held and the district court thereafter denied Mr. Baxter's remaining claims for relief 
When reviewing a decision denying'post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, 
the appellate couit will not uphold the lower coui-t's factual findings if they are clearly erroneous. 
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 849, 103 P.3d 460,462 (2004); Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 
933,936, 120 P.3d 751,754 (Ct. App. 2005). Nonetheless, the appellate court exercises free 
review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 
849, 103 P.3d at 46; Lovelalzd, 141 Idaho at 936, 120 P.3d at 754. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the 
post-conviction procedure act. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789,795, 152 P.3d 1237, 1243 
(Ct. App. 2007); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 
1992). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel will prevail if he shows that (I) 
counsel's performance was deficient, and that (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). A defendant meets the 
deficiency prong when counsel's performance falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,277,971 P.2d 727,730 (1998). The prejudice 
prong is met when the defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 
As a general matter; this Court will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and 
tactical choices. Stale v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546,551,21 P.3d 483,488 (2001). This rule does 
not apply, however, to counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id. 
In this case, i t  is undisputed that the wall of the jail itself was not damaged. Order 
Dismissing Post Conviction Petition, p.3. R. 107. As the district court found, "[tlhere was no 
evidence presented at trial that the wall of the jail cell itself was damaged. Rather, the phone was 
removed from the wall and wires for the phone were sticking out of the wall." Id. At the 
evidentiary hearing, the district court found that: 
Baxter presented evidence from another FSH employee who did not testify at trial. 
This employee confirmed that the phone in question was owned by FSH not the 
jail, that the phone was destroyed and that the Twin Falls Jail was billed $325.67 
for the cost of sepla'cing the telephone and for the necessary labor to install the 
new phone. This evidence of ownership of the phone had not been presented at 
trial. The employee further testified that there was a sharing agreement between 
FSH and the jail for monies generated from the phone's usage by jail inmates. No 
testimony was presented concerning any agreement between FSH and the jail 
from repairing damaged phones. 
Order Dismissing Post Conviction Petition, pp.3-4. R. 107-08. 
Still, the district court held that Mr. Baxter's trial counsel was not ineffective because 
according to its tnte~pretation of Idaho Code 3 18-7018, a "person is guilty of the telony of injury 
to jail if he or she injures any part ofa public jail where that portion of the damaged property is 
integral to the operation of the jail." Order Dismissing Post Conviction Petition, p.7. (Emphasis 
in original.) R. 11 1. The district court determined the phone in this case satisfied its newly 
created iiztegral part of the jail requirement Id. Accordingly, the d~strict court concluded trial 
counsel's performance was not deficient Eor failing to argue that the jail was not actually injured. 
The district coui?'s analysis and conclusion are incorrect. 
During the first session of the Idaho territorial legislature, the original injuring jails 
statute was enacted, proscribing that: 
If any person shall, willfully and intentionally, break down, pull down or 
otherwise destroy, injure, in whole or in part, any public jail or other place of 
confinement, every person so offending shall, on conviction, be fined in any sum 
not exceeding ten thousand dollars, nou less than the value of the said jail or other 
place of confinement so destroyed or of such injury as may have been done thereto 
by such  inl lawful act, and be imprisoned in the territorial prison for any term not 
exceeding five years, nor less than one year. 
Cr. and P. 1864, $ 147. Though no legislative history remains from this legislative session, a 
plain and ordinary reading of the statute conveys the intent behind the new law - that damage 
done to the structure of any public jail is a serious crime. Surely in 1864 legislators did not 
envision this statute encompassing damage to a telephone let alone a telephone not owned by the 
public jail.' 
This statute remained essentially unchanged until 1932 when it was amended and 
' "The telephone was invented in March of 1876. The famous incident in which 
Alexander Graham Bell spilled acid on himself and called out to his assistant, Watson, not 
realizing his voice was being carried over the telephone was on March 10." At 
http://wiki.answers.coi~z/Q/When~was~theteepheinvented (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
recodified as Section 17-4312: 
Every person who wilfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down or 
otherwise destroys or injures any public jail or other place of confinement, is 
punishable by fine not exceeding $10,000, and by imprisonment in the state prison 
not exceeding five years. 
Besides recodification in 1972 to its present section (I.C. S 18-7018), the injuring jails statute has 
remained the same in language slnce 1932 and in Intent smce 1864 
Furthermore, the reported cases involving convictions under Idaho's injuring jails statute 
concern damage done to the structure of the jail itself. See State v. Yancey, 47 Idaho 1,272 P 
495, (1928) (metal ce~llng prlcd down in successf~il escapc attempt); Stale v Wilsorz, 51 Idaho 
. 659, 9 P.2d 487 (1932) (cuttmg holc in holdmg tank and cuttmg through two Iron bars 111 
unsuccessful escape attempt), State v Ash, 94 Idaho 542,493 P 2d 701 (1971) (broken w~ndow) 
Interestmgly, In State v. Ash, the appcliant requested a rehearmg by the Supreme Court for 
clarification of what constitutes a jail. In denying the appellant's request for rehearing the 
Supreme Court stated: 
When we used the term "jail" i n  the opinion, we used the term in its generally 
accepted meaning: "A building designated by law, or regularly used for the 
confinement of persons held in lawful custody." Black's Law Dictionary, rev. 4"' 
ed. 1968, p. 968. A jail is more than a row of cells standing alone; in addition to 
cells, a complete public jail must, of necessity, also have hallways, access routes 
to the cells, a roof, walls, windows, and doors. 
State v. Ash, 94 Idaho 542, 547,493 P.2d 701,706 (1971) 
California has a similar statute concerning damaging public jails.3 Intel-preting that 
' Califolnia Penal Code Section 4600 reads in pertinent part: 
Every person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, or otherwise 
destroys or injures any jail, prison, or any public property in any jail or prison, is 
punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), and by imprisonment 
statute the California Court of Appeals has also adopted a "common usage" definition for the ' 
terms used, clting the same Black's Law Dictionary cited by the Ash Court. People v. Upchurch, 
143 Cal.Rptr. 113, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). The Califomla Coult of Appeals also stated: 
Under [a common usage interpretation], the statute would apply to damage done 
to the grounds, and structure (including fixtures) of a prison, but not to furniture 
or equipment such as a television set. Damage to state-owned fuiniture or 
equipment located in a prison would be punishable as ma'licious mischief, a 
misdeineanor (Pen. code  3 594) but not as the felony offense of destroying or 
damaging the prison itself. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the phone was not state owned equipment. Nor is the 
phone a fixturei or part of the structure of a jail as described by the Ash Court. Moreover, the 
plain meaning of the statute and the common usage of the terms therein conflicts with the 
rationale of the district court in this case. Though the district court found the phone to be 
"integral to the operation of the jail," this does not support a finding that damaging the phone is 
the equivalent of injuring a public jail as set forth in Idaho Code S 18-7018. Moreover, the 
district court acknowledged that there was no evidence presented during the trial that the wail of 
in the state prison, except that where the damage or injury to any city, city and county, or 
county jail property or prison property is determined to be four hundred dollars ($400) or 
less, that person is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
California case law is particularly signilicant because Idaho large])/ adopted the 
California penal code when it became a Territory. People v. Ah Choy, 1 Idaho 317 (Idaho Ten.. 
1870) ("The laws of this teilritory are conceded to be copies from the laws in force in California; 
that being so, the supreme court of Idaho may very properly, in construing its laws, follow the 
decisions of the supreme court in California."). 
A fixture is defined as "personal property that is attached to land or a building and that 
is regarded as an irremovable part of the real property, such as a fireplace built into a home." 
Black's Law Dictionary 7" ed. 1999, p.654. 
Mr. Baxter's cell was damaged. 
As a result, trial counsel was deficient because he never argued in a Rule 29 motion or to 
the jury that M*. Baxter did not injure the jail as contemplated by the statute for which he was on 
trial. See Ex. A, p.60 &Ex. B, pp.82-83. Though common sense alone suggests the argument, 
had trial counsel done basic legal research, as required by Strickland, he would have linown the 
injuring jails statute required proof of damage to the jail grounds, structure, or perhaps a state 
owned fixture. But unexplainably, trial counsel's level of competence and advocacy fell below 
the constitutionally acceptable threshold when he failed to argue that Mr. Baxter did not injure a 
public jail. 
The deficiency of trial counsel resulted in Mr. Baxter being convicted of a crime he did 
uot commit while also being found to be a persistent violator. The prejudice is therefore self- 
evident 
C. The District Court Erred wlze~z it Concluded Mr. Baxter did not Receive Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel on Direct Appeal Because it was Objectively U~zreasonable for 
Appellate Courzsel to Not Challenge tlze Szcfficiency of tlze Evidence. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 1.9-852, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to 
effective assistance of counsel during any appeal. See Hema~zdez v. State, 127 Idaho 685,687, 
905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995). Further, the Due Process Clause of the Foulteenth Amendment requires 
states to ensure that an indigent appellant receive effective assistance of counsel on his first 
appeal of right from a judgment of conviction. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.  387, 396 (1985); 
Aragoiz v. State, 114 Idaho 758,765,760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). To that end, appellate counsel 
is required to make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best 
arguments to be made. Jukoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280,285, 32 P.3d 672,677 (Ct. App. 2001); 
LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct.'App.1997). 
Here, the only Issue appellate counsel ralsed was that the d~strict court abused tts 
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. Appellant's Brief, Ex. C. It can safely be said 
that, absent extraordinary circumstances, any appellate argument has a better chance of success 
than a challenge to a sentence that falls within statutory limits. This is particularly true given the 
one year fixed sentence as in thls case. In order to show that the sentence imposed was 
unreasonable, and tlxis an abuse of the court's discretion, the defendant must show that the 
sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts 
State 11. Al-Kotrnizi, 141 Idaho 66,70, 106 P.3d 392,396 (2005). Such challenges are rarely 
successful. See Al-Kotrnizi, 141 Idaho at 71, 106 P.3d at 397; Stale v. Culley, 140 Idaho 663, 
666,99 P.3d 616, 619 (2004); State v. Jeppeselz,l38 Idaho 71,76, 57 P.3d 782,787 (2002); State 
v. Straii.d, 137 Idaho 457; 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002); State v. Treviizo, 132 ~da'ho 888, 897, 
980 P.2d 552, 561 (1999). Conversely, when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence at trial, this Coult must determine, based upon its independent consideration of the 
evidence, whether there was substantial and competent evidence to s~ippoit he verdict. State v. 
Hollo~z, 136 Idaho 499, 501, 36 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001). 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution precludes conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 
a defendant is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970). 
In short, Winship presupposes as an essential of the due process guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a 
criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to 
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every 
element of the offense. 
Jacksorz v. Vifginia, 443 U.S. 307,316 (1979). In the case where a properly instructed jury has 
convicted even though no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a seasonable doubt, 
that conviction cannot constitutionally stand. Jacksorz, 443 US. ,  pg. 318. Besides, as is the case 
here, a criminal defendant need not even move for a judgment of acquittal in order to preserve for 
appeal the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support a guilty 
verdict. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877,908 P.2d 566, 570 (1995); St& v. Ashley, 126 
Idaho 694,696,889 P.2d 723,725 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Accordingly, challenging the sufficiency of evidence ge~zerally has a better chance of 
success on appeal than an argument that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence. It was objectively unreasonable for appellate counsel to conclude that a 
challenge to Mr. Baxter's sentence, instead of challenging whether there was sufficient proof to 
uphold a criminal conviction, wasthe best argument to be made. 
Moreover, had appellate counsel raised the sufficiency of evidence issue, the result of Mr. 
Baxter's appeal would have been different. As explained above in Section C, Mr. Baxter was 
convicted for a crime he did not commit. The phone was not owned by the jail. There was no 
evidence presented that the wall of his jail cell was damaged. Mr. Baxter's damaging a phone 
owned by FSH Communications is not the sort of conduct conteinplated by the statute Mr. 
Baxter was convicted under. There could be no strategic or tactical reason to forgo Mr. Baxter's 
sufficiency of evidence argument for the sake of focusing the Court's attention on his sentencing 
challenge. By failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as an issue on direct appeal, 
appellate counsel deprived Mr. Baxter of his only opportunity to have an independent court 
consider the validity of the evidence and his conviction. 
Mr. Baxter should not have been convicted for this crime. Accordingly; there is a 
reasonable probability that if appellate counsel had challenged the sufficiency of evidence on 
appeal, the result would have been different. Mr. Baxter therefore proved that he was prejudiced 
by appellate counsel's deficient performance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Baxter respectfully asks thss Court to reverse the hstrsct court's orders deny~ng h ~ s  
petition for post-conviction relief and to vacate the judgment of conviction and afford Mr. Baxter 
a new trial with coullsel or alteinatively to remand for fusther post-conviction proceedings 
Respectfully submitted this A day of October, 2009. 
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